

# The Analytic of Principles II – Causation

PHIL 4/871

October 9, 2018

## 1 The Analogies

- Principles concerning truths generated from application of the categories of *relation* (<substance>, <cause>, <community>)
- Q<sub>1</sub>: What is an “analogy”?<sup>1,2</sup>
- Q<sub>2</sub>: Are the analogies making epistemic or metaphysical claims?

## 2 The Second Analogy (A189-211/B231-B256)

*The Causal Principle:* All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect (B231)

- Q<sub>3</sub>: What is an “alteration”?<sup>3</sup>
- Q<sub>4</sub>: What are the relata of the cause-effect relation?
  - events (standard reading)
  - substances & their causal powers (Watkins 2005)
- Q<sub>5</sub>: Is a disparity between the causal relata fatal for the existence of a real dispute between Hume and Kant?<sup>4</sup>

### 2.1 The Argument(s) of the Second Analogy

- Q<sub>6</sub>: How many arguments are there in the Second Analogy?<sup>5</sup>
  1. Argument from faculty psychology<sup>6</sup>
  2. Argument concerning objective vs. subjective time determination
- Q<sub>7</sub>: How do we connect the argument to Hume?
  - According to Hume representation of causal relations is based on the habitual connection of sequences of constant conjunction
  - The Humean argument presupposes that we can distinguish the objective sequence of events from our subjective train of sense experiences (e.g. representation of the house vs. the riverboat)
    - \* How is this possible on the Humean model?
    - \* According to Kant temporal order depends on the application of a rule for objectively ordering a time series–i.e. depends on the concept <cause>

<sup>1</sup> [An analogy is] not the identity of two **quantitative** [relations, as in mathematical analogy] but [the identity] of two **qualitative** relations, where from three given members I can cognize and give *a priori* only the **relation** to a fourth member but not **this** fourth **member** itself, although I have a rule for seeking it in experience and a mark for discovering it there (B222)

<sup>2</sup> An analogy of experience will therefore be only a rule in accordance with which unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not as a perception itself, as empirical intuition in general), and as a principle it will not be valid of the objects (of the appearances) **constitutively** but merely **regulatively**. (B222)

<sup>3</sup> the concept of alteration presupposes one and the same subject as existing with two opposed determinations, and thus as persisting (B233; cf. B230)

<sup>4</sup> What we're left with on Watkins's view by way of clear variation from broadly Humean theories is that Kant invokes irreducible active causal powers and, by contrast with Hume's own view, the first relatum of a causal relation can persist beyond an instant. It remains unclear whether the idea that causal powers or grounds are indeterminate diverges from what broadly Humean theories might endorse. (Chignell and Pereboom (2010), 586)

<sup>5</sup> This section, as Kant very rightly felt, contains one of the most important and fundamental arguments of the entire Critique; and this would seem to be the reason why he has so multiplied the proofs which he gives of the Analogy. Within the limits of the section no less than five distinct proofs are to be found, and still another was added in the second edition. (Kemp Smith 2003, 363)

<sup>6</sup> connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. (B233)

## 2.2 Dicker's Reconstruction of the Time Determination Argument<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> (Dicker 2004, 173).

1. We cannot experience that an [objective] event—that is, a transition from a state A to a state B—is occurring solely by knowing any of the following (either individually or jointly)
  - (a) that the perceptions of A and B occur in the order A, B
  - (b) that the perceptions of A and B are irreversible
  - (c) that A precedes B by reference to absolute time
  - (d) that these perceptions are of successive states of things-in-themselves.
2. If (1), then the only way we can experience that an event is occurring is by knowing that B follows A according to a rule, that is, that the event has a cause.
3. If the only way we can experience that an event has a cause, then any event such that we can know of its occurrence by experience must have a cause.
4. ∴ Any event such that we can know of its occurrence by experience must have a cause.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> if therefore we experience that something happens, then we presuppose that something precedes it on which it follows according to a rule (B240)

## References & Further Reading

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