Kant’s project of defending our knowledge of true synthetic a priori judgments in metaphysics requires a defense of the legitimacy of the basic concepts of metaphysics. But which concepts are the most basic? This week we start our discussion of the Transcendental Analytic with a look at the section of the Critique of Pure Reason called the “Metaphysical Deduction”, in which Kant gives us an argument for determining which concepts are fundamental to metaphysics, and how they could be cognized a priori.
- CPR: Transcendental Logic & Analytic (the Clue), B91-116 (Guyer & Wood, 201-18)
- CPR: Analytic ch. 2, §13 & Transition, B116-29 (Guyer & Wood, 219-26)
- Optional: Longuenesse, “Kant on A Priori Concepts”
- Optional: Allison, “The Intellectual Conditions of Human Cognition”
- Optional: Notes on the Metaphysical Deduction
- What are the “forms of judgment”?
- Why does Kant think that the forms of judgment provide a “clue” to the categories?
- How many forms of judgment and categories are there?
- What is the difference between the logical and the real use of the understanding?
- What is “synthesis”?