This week we discuss further Kant’s argument for construing space and time as mere forms of sensibility. We’ll discuss his seeming inference from the putative fact that space and time are forms of sensibility to the conclusion that they are only forms of sensibility and nothing “in themselves”. We’ll also discuss some possibilities for interpreting the overall sense in which his position is “idealist.”
- CPR: Transcendental Aesthetic (B59-73; Guyer & Wood, 185-92)
- Prolegomena, Note III (Kant replying to critics of his idealism)
- (Optional): Allison, Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Realism
- Henry Allison’s now classic discussion & defense of Kant’s idealism
- (Optional): Allais, Manifest Reality, ch. 1
- An overview of a ’moderate’ metaphysical reading of Kant’s idealism
- (optional): Melemedoff-Vosters, “Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited”
- A discussion of how Kant’s idealist argument fits with his contention that representation of space & time is a priori
- (Optional): Stang, Transcendental Idealism (SEP entry; particularly §§1-2)
- An excellent and thorough overview of various elements of the interpretive and philosophical debate concerning Kant’s idealism
- What is “Empirical Realism”?
- What is “Transcendental Idealism”?
- In what sense might we consider TI to be merely “epistemic”?
- In what sense might we consider TI to be a “metaphysical” position?
- What is being agreed upon or disagreed upon in the interpretation of TI?