We begin our discussion of Kant’s moral theory by looking at his argument for freedom as autonomy in the third section of the Groundwork and related passages from the Critique of Practical Reason. Joining us for our discussion is Jessica Tizzard, and we’ll be looking at some forthcoming work from her on these issues as well (see the Discord thread for her paper).
Readings
- Groundwork, section III: 4:446-63
- Review of Schultz (Practical Philosophy, 7-10)
- CPrR: §7, 5:30-1 (Practical Philoosphy, 164-5)
- CPR: Canon – “On the ultimate end of the pure use of our reason”, A797-804/B825-832 (Guyer & Wood pp. 673-76)
- Optional: Korsgaard, ’Introduction third section
- Optional: O’Neill, ’Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III’
- Optional: Korsgaard, ’Morality as Freedom’, ch. 6 in Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Questions
- Why is freedom a property of all rational wills?
- What does it mean to say that the will is ’autonomous’?
- Why think that an autonomous will must be a good will?
- In what sense does Kant meant to provide a proof of the moral law in section III?
- What is the circle concerning the relationship between freedom and morality?
- How does Kant think we can break out of the circle?